The documents contained on this website provide a glimpse into a dangerous time. We see two powerful countries play a dangerous game of brinkmanship over the placement of nuclear weapons close to each other. When the United States placed Jupiter missiles in Turkey, the Soviets responded by placing them in Cuba. When the Americans discovered this, a showdown ensued. It is worth remembering that the nuclear arsenal of each country had enough warheads to kill hundreds of millions. The US had a stockpile of over 7,000 strategic and nearly 20,000 tactical nuclear warheads. The Soviets had over 3,300 total warheads, including 52 ICBM's capable of hitting the United States of America. The stakes were higher than at any time in history. It took deep discussion in each country, and a willingness to finally step away from the edge of war from John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev for crisis to be averted.
These documents, beginning with the President's Briefing on October 16, 1962, and ending with the Postmortem of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. thirteen days later, can shed some light on the how the decisions of Kennedy and Khrushchev were made. Beginning with the Briefing on October 16th, we see Kennedy as the cold, hard truth is provided to him by his intelligence experts. The President is at first concerned with getting information on when the missiles will be ready to launch, as well as how vulnerable they are to American destruction. Discussion then moves to what the U.S. Response should be. At multiple points, the question is raised – why would the Soviets do this? Dean Rusk correctly surmises that Khrushchev is putting pressure on America to “live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that he has to live under fear of ours.” Kennedy is mostly gathering information from those present for much of the meeting, asking questions on military readiness, and displaying a concern for keeping the matter as quiet as possible.
The second document, Theodore Sorensen's Memo to the President of October 18th provides an excellent summary of possible actions the U.S. might take and who in the meeting supports which action. The option of a limited air strike is backed by Rusk, George Ball (Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs), and Vice President Johnson. A larger airstrike is supported by Gen. Maxwell Taylor (Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Special Adviser Dean Acheson, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. A naval blockade, better a naval quarantine that is less aggressive than a total blockade, finds favor among Russian expert Charles Bohlen, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson, and Edwin Martin from the State Department. There is no consensus among Kennedy's advisers, but there is a fear that an attack on Cuba might not take out all the weapons and would probably lead to a military response from the Soviets.
The third document, the Minutes from a Meeting at the Kremlin on October 22, 1962 provides insight into Soviet thinking. Khrushchev acknowledges that the Soviets wanted to threaten the Americans, but did not wish for things to have gone this far. We can already see Khrushchev pulling back by ordering ships that have not arrived in Cuba back. At the same time, the Soviets feel an American attack is quite likely, and order the use of tactical nuclear weapons if necessary, but not strategic nuclear weapons, yet.
The fourth document, Kennedy's Letter to Khrushchev on October 22nd, shows Kennedy assuring Khrushchev that the U.S. will not allow the Cuban missiles to stay, under any circumstance. The President is clear in his message that he is resolute and determined to protect American interests in the U.S. sphere of influence. Later that evening, the President addresses the nation on the crisis. Kennedy labels the missiles “an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas.” The President argues that the installation of weapons in Cuba is a violation of international law, and was done in a manner of dishonesty by the Soviets. Kennedy announces that the U.S. will impose a naval quarantine on Cuba.
Khrushchev's reply, on October 23rd, equals Kennedy's letter in its firmness. Citing international law, Khrushchev calls any naval quarantine illegal, accuses the U.S. of interfering in the internal matters of Cuba and the U.S.S.R., and labels the weapons in Cuba as defensive in nature, and therefore, no threat to America.
The next document is a letter from Cuban leader Fidel Castro to Khrushchev dated October 26th. Castro seems ready for nuclear war if attacked, and he urges the Soviet leader to meet any invasion of Cuba with the “elimination” of any American nuclear threat. He is asking Khrushchev to strike first with nuclear weapons if Cuba is attacked. His willingness to risk a nuclear holocaust is alarming.
We can hear President Kennedy discuss the viability of a trade of the American missiles in Turkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba in a recording of a meeting at the White House on October 27th. The President seems ready to deal, but there is concern of how this will play among American allies in NATO. Kennedy offers the deal and Khrushchev accepts on October 28th. The Postmortem from Arthur Schlesinger on October 29th provides the President with analysis of what went right in the aversion of war, as well as what lessons he can take from this.
It is fascinating to watch the President deal with the crisis through these documents. He performs admirably throughout, relying on his advisers for discussion and intelligence, carefully weighing his options, communicating American resolve to Moscow and to the American public, and finally offering a peaceful resolution, which Khrushchev agrees to. For his part, Khrushchev seems to have quickly recognized that the deployment of weapons to Cuba was a dangerous mistake. Ultimately, his act of provocation brought a removal of some missiles directly threatening the Soviet Union, and the beginning of a turning point in the Cold War. With the crisis over, the two powers recognize the need to engage in the de-escalation of nuclear weapons, exemplified by the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty the next year, and the world will step back from the brink.
These documents, beginning with the President's Briefing on October 16, 1962, and ending with the Postmortem of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. thirteen days later, can shed some light on the how the decisions of Kennedy and Khrushchev were made. Beginning with the Briefing on October 16th, we see Kennedy as the cold, hard truth is provided to him by his intelligence experts. The President is at first concerned with getting information on when the missiles will be ready to launch, as well as how vulnerable they are to American destruction. Discussion then moves to what the U.S. Response should be. At multiple points, the question is raised – why would the Soviets do this? Dean Rusk correctly surmises that Khrushchev is putting pressure on America to “live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that he has to live under fear of ours.” Kennedy is mostly gathering information from those present for much of the meeting, asking questions on military readiness, and displaying a concern for keeping the matter as quiet as possible.
The second document, Theodore Sorensen's Memo to the President of October 18th provides an excellent summary of possible actions the U.S. might take and who in the meeting supports which action. The option of a limited air strike is backed by Rusk, George Ball (Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs), and Vice President Johnson. A larger airstrike is supported by Gen. Maxwell Taylor (Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Special Adviser Dean Acheson, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. A naval blockade, better a naval quarantine that is less aggressive than a total blockade, finds favor among Russian expert Charles Bohlen, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson, and Edwin Martin from the State Department. There is no consensus among Kennedy's advisers, but there is a fear that an attack on Cuba might not take out all the weapons and would probably lead to a military response from the Soviets.
The third document, the Minutes from a Meeting at the Kremlin on October 22, 1962 provides insight into Soviet thinking. Khrushchev acknowledges that the Soviets wanted to threaten the Americans, but did not wish for things to have gone this far. We can already see Khrushchev pulling back by ordering ships that have not arrived in Cuba back. At the same time, the Soviets feel an American attack is quite likely, and order the use of tactical nuclear weapons if necessary, but not strategic nuclear weapons, yet.
The fourth document, Kennedy's Letter to Khrushchev on October 22nd, shows Kennedy assuring Khrushchev that the U.S. will not allow the Cuban missiles to stay, under any circumstance. The President is clear in his message that he is resolute and determined to protect American interests in the U.S. sphere of influence. Later that evening, the President addresses the nation on the crisis. Kennedy labels the missiles “an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas.” The President argues that the installation of weapons in Cuba is a violation of international law, and was done in a manner of dishonesty by the Soviets. Kennedy announces that the U.S. will impose a naval quarantine on Cuba.
Khrushchev's reply, on October 23rd, equals Kennedy's letter in its firmness. Citing international law, Khrushchev calls any naval quarantine illegal, accuses the U.S. of interfering in the internal matters of Cuba and the U.S.S.R., and labels the weapons in Cuba as defensive in nature, and therefore, no threat to America.
The next document is a letter from Cuban leader Fidel Castro to Khrushchev dated October 26th. Castro seems ready for nuclear war if attacked, and he urges the Soviet leader to meet any invasion of Cuba with the “elimination” of any American nuclear threat. He is asking Khrushchev to strike first with nuclear weapons if Cuba is attacked. His willingness to risk a nuclear holocaust is alarming.
We can hear President Kennedy discuss the viability of a trade of the American missiles in Turkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba in a recording of a meeting at the White House on October 27th. The President seems ready to deal, but there is concern of how this will play among American allies in NATO. Kennedy offers the deal and Khrushchev accepts on October 28th. The Postmortem from Arthur Schlesinger on October 29th provides the President with analysis of what went right in the aversion of war, as well as what lessons he can take from this.
It is fascinating to watch the President deal with the crisis through these documents. He performs admirably throughout, relying on his advisers for discussion and intelligence, carefully weighing his options, communicating American resolve to Moscow and to the American public, and finally offering a peaceful resolution, which Khrushchev agrees to. For his part, Khrushchev seems to have quickly recognized that the deployment of weapons to Cuba was a dangerous mistake. Ultimately, his act of provocation brought a removal of some missiles directly threatening the Soviet Union, and the beginning of a turning point in the Cold War. With the crisis over, the two powers recognize the need to engage in the de-escalation of nuclear weapons, exemplified by the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty the next year, and the world will step back from the brink.